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In The Supreme Court
Of The State Of Utah
GEORGE SALTAS,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
DAVID A. AFFLECK, doing business
under the name and style of D. A.
AFFLECK GROCERY,

Defendant,

J
'
Case
No. 6190

~

KENNETH BUITE,
Defendant and Appellant.

REPLY BRIEF
We will discuss the questions in the order of respondent's brief.
Apparently counsel for respondent fails to appreciate the nature of and the amount of damages that are
recoverable under our Utah death statute, particularly
by a father for the death of an adult son. At least the
authorities cited by counsel so reflect, inasmuch as
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he has not cited one case in point sustaining his contention that the verdict rendered by the jury on the
first trial was inadequate.
RESPONDENT'S CASES

First, we call attention to the fact that how large a
verdict the jury might have rendered under the evidence
is wholly beside the point. There is a large range between inadequate damages and excessive damages, particularly in a death case where actual pecuniary loss
is uncertain. The question is not how large a verdict
the jury might have rendered, but was the verdict so
inadequate that it could be said the trial court was
justified in setting it aside under Section 104-40-7, Revised Statutes of Utah 1933, now relied upon by respondent. Clearly the following cases have no application in
that they simply consider what damages were not excessive.
Berry v. Dewey, (Kan.) 172 Pac. 27;
El Paso Railroad Co. v. Buttery, 216 S. W. 817,
(apparently respondent's citation of this case
is incorrect.)

Bright v. Thatcher, (Mo.) 215 S. W. 788;
McMahon v. Flynn, (Minn.) 191 N. W. 902;
Louisville Ry. Co. v. Smith (Ky.) 263 S. W. 29.
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Klinge v. So. Pac. Co., 89 Utah 284, 57 Pac. (2d)
367, had to do with permanent injuries for loss of an

arm, causing loss of earning power for life and was
not an action for death.

Skidmore v. Seattle (Wash.) 244 Pac. 545, had to do
· with a right of a father to recover for the value of the
services of a minor child from the time of injury until
majority. Deceased was fifteen at the time of his death.
It is significant that nothing was awarded either in the
trial court or the appellate court for pecuniary loss to
the father after deceased would have reached his majority.
Pierre v. Powell Box Company, 77 So. 943, and
JVirth v. Alex-Dussell Iron TVorks, 74 So. 551, both come
from the State of Louisiana. Why the damages in these
cases were inadequate is obvious. At page seventeen of
our original brief, we purposely pointed out that the
Louisiana death statute is fundamentally different from
our Utah statute, in that in Louisiana not only actual
damages to the heirs, including anguish and suffering
caused such heirs, are allowed, but also such damages as
the deceased might have recovered had he survived. See
Reed v. vVarren (La.} 132 So. 250. In the Pierre case
'"-hich was for the death of a sixteen year old son, the
court had this to say:
"In view of the fact that plaintiffs are suing
in the right of deceased. who suffered much durSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ing the say seventeen months which intervened
between the accident and his death, and also in
their own right for the loss by death of the prospective support, companionship and felial affection, upon which they were entitled to rely, we
are further of the opinion that the damages
awarded by the district court should be increased.
* * * His right arm was caught between the wheels
and crushed as a stalk of sugar-cane is crushed
between the rollers of a mill, and he sustained
serious injury to his side."
Contrast our Utah statute, where only actual pecuniary damages sustained by the heirs on account of the
death are recoverable and nothing for suffering of deceased or his injury, or anguish and suffering of the
heirs. Wirth v. Alex-Dussell Iron Works, supra, the other
Louisiana case cited by respondent, was for the death of
a husband and father leaving a widow and three minor
children, he being their sole support.

Gibson v. Wineman, 106 So. 826, a Mississippi case
is distinguishable on the same grounds as the Louisiana
cases. The Mississippi statute unlike Utah was dual in
character, allowing damages deceased could have recovered for the injury, and also damages caused the heirs
by the death. The following quotation from the case reveals the character of the Mississippi statute:
"He suffered intense pain. There was no
element of contributory negligence * * * and
appellant was entitled to recover damages of
every kind to the decedent and also all damages
of every kind to her as the widow."
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Specifically, what item of damage or damages the
jury neglected to consider is nowhere disclosed by plain-

tiff, and as we have specifically pointed out, each of
the cases cited by plaintiff is readily distinguishable from
the instant case. We are not concerned with a case wherein recovery can be had for services of a minor child,
for services of a deceased wife, nor for loss of support
of a father or husband having a legal obligation to support his wife and children. This case has nothing whatsoever to do with damages recoverable in a personal injury action, with loss of earnings, injury, pain, and
suffering and the like. Our statute is not a survival
statute like those of Louisiana and Mississippi, (Mason
v. Union Pacific Railroad Company, "l Utah "l"l), but
only pecuniary damages resulting to the heirs (in this
case the father of deceased) can be recovered. Nothing
can be allowed for sentimental loss or grief and sorrow.
How large a verdict the jury might have rendered is
wholly beside the point. The value of a human life has
nothing to do with the measure of damages in an action
for wrongful death under our Utah Statute as counsel
would have believe in his closing argument, where he
attempts to inject the idea that, "Nothing is more precious
than life."
We consider it unnecessary here to again specifically enumerate all of the reasons fully set out in our original brief why in view of all the evidence, including
cross examination, the actual loss to plaintiff was not
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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necessarily substantial, and that the jury as fair minded men were fully justified in returning a verdict of
$800.00. We feel it unnecessary to call specific attention
to each of the numerous cases cited in our original
brief where damages ranging from nominal damages
to a few hundred dollars have been held adequate,
particularly in cases of the death of an adult, unmarried man, and that it was erro'r to set aside such verdicts,
the measure of recovery being peculiarly a question
for the jury.
Under Section 104-40-'!, relied on by respondent,
the court cannot set aside a verdict for inadequacy of
the damages where the evidence justifies the verdict
rendered. In Hirabelli v. Daniels, it was error to set
aside a verdict in an action for personal injuries for
$1.00 for pain and suffering and for $22.00 reasonable
medical treatment, although $50.00 had actually been
paid for such treatment. The court there says:
"To justify the court in interfering, it should
be made to appear that the jury plainly disregarded or misconceived the instructions or the
evidence or acted under the influence of passion
or prejudice."
In .Jensen v. Denver & Rio Grande Company, 138
Pac. 1185, 44 Utah 100, at pages 121 and 122, referring to
what was then our present Section 104-40-7, the court
said:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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"Neither is either party on that question entitled to the judgment of the court below in a
case of tort tried to a jury. Both parties, as to
that, are entitled to the unprejudiced judgment
of the jury. That is exclusively within their province. Their power and discretion, when properly exercised and when they have been properly
directed as to the measure of damages and the
mode of assessing it, may not be interfered with
merely because the court above or below may
think. the amount rendered is too large, or even
may think it appears to he larger than the evidence apparently or fairly justifies. A court,
vacating a verdict and granting a new trial by
merely setting up his opinion or judgment against
that of the jury, hut usurps judicial power and
prostitutes the constitutional trial hy jury. * * *
It should clearly he made to appear that the jury
totally mistook or disregarded the rules of law
hy which the damages were to be regulated, or
wholly misconceived or disregarded all the evidence, and hy so doing committed gross and palpable error hy rendering a verdict so enormous
or outrageous or unjust as to be attributable to
neither the charge nor the evidence, but only to
passion or prejudice."
And counsel in referring to 46 C. J., page 20?_,~
page 11 of respondent's brief, fails to quote from page
211 as follows:
"In some jurisdictions, especially under statutes, the inadequacy must be so great as to indicate passion, prejudice, or other improper motive on the part of the jury."
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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And Utah, among other states specifically enumerated,
is listed.
Appellant attempts to make a point of the fact
that the jury deliberated for only an hour. We see no reason why this would not be sufficient to jurors of ordinary intelligence, particularly when they had already
heard the evidence (on damage only one witness) and
had full opportunity to hear the arguments of counsel.
The jury was properly instructed on the measure of
damages and it is presumed they followed the instructions of the court. Paxton v. Spencer, 265 Pac. ?51, 71
Utah 313 at page 326; Coke v. Timbey, 192 Pac., 624, 57
Utah 53, at page 60; Dee v. San Pedro L. A. and S. L.
R. Co., 16?' Pac. 246, 50 Utah 16?' at page 188; Harris v.
Ogden Steam Laundry Company, 11 ?' Pac. ?'00, 39 Utah
436. It is assumed that the jurors selected were men of
ordinary intelligence, with minds of their own, and
conscientious in respect to their duties. State v. DeTVeese,
1?'2 Pac. 290, 51 Utah 515 at page 524. And until the contrary clearly appears, it must be presumed that the jury,
being fair-minded men, in rendering the verdict expressed their honest judgment. Carpenter v. Dicky, 26
N. Dak. 1?6, 143 N. W. 964.
All of the jurors in the instant case were agreed
the damages would be between $500.00 and $1,000.00.
None were in favor of a larger verdict. (Pff. Tr. 103-106).
It is not likely that all the jurors disregarded the eviSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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dence or instructions, and there was no showing to the
effect in support of the motion. The burden was on the
plaintiff in this case to prove actual pecuniary loss
to plaintiff, and little, if any, was shown. No special
damages were asked for. There was no showing of passion or prejudice, nor a plain disregard by the jury of
the instructions of the court, or the evidence in the cas~
as required by the Statute. The verdict of $800.00 was
fairly and justly rendered and was certainly justified
by the evidence. We respectfully submit that the trial
court erred in setting aside the verdict of the jury on
the first trial.
INJECTION OF INSURANCE INTO THE CASE

Although Egan v. O'Malley, (Wyo.) 21 Pac. (2d)
821, Pc:tge 16 respondent's brief, goes about as far as any
of the cases in permitting examination of the jurors on
voir dire, and even in that case, there was no mention
of any specific insurance company, and there was no
further reference or suggestion of insurance after the
voir dire examination and during the trial of the case.
The court says on page 823:
"There appears to have been no further
reference made to the matter after the necessary
questions were put and answered or after the
conclusion of the voir dire examination of the
jurors."
The Egan case was one of first impression in Wyoming,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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and like in Balle v. Smith, a suggestive procedure was
outlined in questioning jurors as a caution to attorneys
in future cases. This and the Balle v. Smith case should
not constitute a license for attorneys to over-emphasize
the matter of insurance before the jury by the asking
of unnecessary questions, even on voir dire examination, and as stated in Parker v. Bushouse (Mich.) 236
N. W. 222, cited in both Balle v. Smith and the Egan
case, further reference to insurance during the trial of
the case should be excluded "under penalty of a reversal of the case."
MISCONDUCT DURING THE TRIAL

"Right after the accident you made out an affidavit to-you gave a statement to a man by the name
of Parkinson, who is an adjustor for an insurance company?" There is no mistaking here that counsel himself
injected not only the word "adjuster" but directly connected the name of Parkinson, who counsel well knew
was actually associated with Mr. Stewart in the defense
of defendant Affleck. Nor can it be questioned that direct
reference was made to the "insurance company."
By what stretch of the imagination counsel excuses
this misconduct by reason of Reid v. Owens, (Utah)
93 Pac. (2d) 680, we are unable to understand. In that
case the liability of the defendant father for the negligent
acts of his son was only provable by the admission of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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the father that on account of the carelessness · of the
son, he had taken out insurance to protect him. The
admission was a necessary part of plaintiff's case. There
is no such necessity when a witness is examined on cross
examination in connection with a written statement,
when the contents of the statement are what the court
and jury are concerned with and not the fact that the
statement was given to an adjuster for an insurance
company.
We do not question the right of counsel on either
side to examine a witness in connection with a statement. That does not necessitate or justify any reference
to an insurance company or an adjuster or anything of
that kind.
Just what use counsel intended to make of the
statement to Parkinson, if any, is very vague. He claims
it was a statement made right after the accident, but
Mr. Stewart offered counsel such statement made to
Mr. Parkinson on the 28th day of January, 1938, the
day following the accident, the only statement made,
but counsel declined to use it. Was the question asked
in good faith? Counsel claims i¥' was important to show
that the witness had previously told Parkinson that
she had not seen the car until it loomed right in front of
the car in which she was riding, yet counsel never of~
fered at any time to prove that the witness made any
such statement to Parkinson.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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But even if we should grant, which we do not,
that there was some legitimate purpose in referring to
the statement made to Parkinson, the authorities all
hold that it is unnecessary and improper to refer to an insurance company or an adjuster. We will not undertake
here to again comment on the numerous cases which
condemn the attempt on counsel's part to bring out the
fact that a certain statement was given to an agent
for an insurance company, notwithstanding the statement itself might be used for some legitimate purpose
at the trial. On this point we invite careful consideration to the cases cited on pages 41 to 53 of our original
brief. The courts all condemn such reference to insur·
ance, whether by counsel himself, or through a witness
by the obvious efforts of counsel, and notwithstanding
that such statement might otherwise serve a legitimate
purpose.
ARGUMENT TO THE JURY

Neither is there any misunderstanding that counsel was guilty of deliberate misconduct in his closing
argument to the jury, when he left no doubt in the jurors'
minds that an insurance company was defending the
action. Even eliminating ·the word "ADJUSTER" to which
counsel objects, (reference is made to exact words in
abstract) his argument was equally effective. He had
already himself deliberately brought out in the evidence the fact that Norma Chamberlain had right after
the accident made out a statement to Parkinson, an
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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adjuster for an insurance company, and in view of this
and his past examination of each juror on voir dire,
his argument that "on the day of the accident or soon
thereafter, an INVESTIGATOR was out at the scene of
the accident" could only be suggestive of one thing,
and that was the ADJUSTER to whom Norma Chamberlain
right after the accident had given a statement. Whether
the word INVESTIGATOR or ADJUSTER was used is in·
significant. To the lay mind they are synonymous, and
the jury was well educated during the trial. It is the
course of improper conduct of counsel throughout the
trial of which appellant complains. Counsel's argument
that "defendant secured an attorney who spends all
his time in the defense of this class of cases" is not
disputed in any particular. The court had already denied
defendant's vigorous objections to the obvious purpose of counsel in examining each and every juror to
an unnecessary extent on insurance, and specifically
the Northwest Casualty Company, and had already
without even reprimanding counsel overruled (Tr. 192',
Ab. 92') defendant's objection to counsel's questioning
Norma Chamberlain about the insurance adjuster. The
harmful effect of arguing matters in the presence of
the jury is well known to counsel. How then, can he
claim that appellant's objection to his argument to the
jury was not timely, simply because appellant's counsel saw fit to not discuss and emphasize insurance before the jury, but rather make proper and timely objection immediately after the jury had withdrawn, but
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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before the instructions and exhibits were delivered to
them. See Tr. 321. Objections of counsel and comments
of the court and discussions before the jury would undoubtedly do further damage. As pointed out in Georgeson v. Nielson, (Wis.) 260 N. W. 461, that is often exactly what counsel for plaintiff is seeking. In that case
it is said:
"Objection to the remark of opposing counsel enhances likelihood that the intended effect
will he produced both by attracting attention to
it, and by invoking a repudiation. Remark being
made, or made and repudiated, the intended effect
is probably produced. * * * Even a reprimand
to offending counsel does not cure the wrong done
to litigants by prejudicial remarks."
Counsel seems to object to the fact that appellant
preserved a record of this case and claims the procedure
of appellant as unorthodox in introducing the insurance
policy in evidence for the benefit of the court to show
that the coverage under the policy did not extend to
Kenneth Butte as an individual using the truck for his
own purposes. Certainly Kenneth Butte was entitled
to a fair trial without the wrongful injection of insur·
ance into the case. Certainly counsel for Kenneth Butte
had not only the right, but the duty to see that Kenneth
Butte got a fair trial. The common attempt in personal
injury actions to wrongfully get before the jury the
matter of insurance is well-known among practicing
attorneys and trial judges, as evidenced by the express
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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statements of plaintiff's counsel in this case, and counsel for defendant in such cases is called to guard against
such prejudicial matter. We see no point to counsel's
objection that appellant preserved a record for review.
As this court stated in Reid v. Owem, supra, "we
would he closing our eyes to a fact well-known to trial
courts and trial lawyers were we to assert that the probability of any jury being influenced in determining the
question of liability and the question of the amount
of recovery by the fact that an insurance company
would pay the damages assessed is so remote as not
to challenge judicial notice." In our original brief, we
have set forth any number of cases which definitely
hold that the injection of insurance into a case is so
highly prejudicial that it cannot he said defendant has
received a fair trial either on the issues of liability or
on the issues of damage, and an instruction of the court
cannot remove the probability· of prejudice and there
ls :reversible error. In this case, insurance was injected
into the case during every important step of the trial,
on voir dire examination of each juror, during the trial
of the case on examination of witnesses, in argument
to the jury, and was even discussed in the jury room.
(Ab. 31). Counsel disregarded all precautions outlined
in Balle v. Smith. No opportunity was lost to prejudicially inform each and every juryman on voir dire examination. Misconduct during the trial in the examination of
witnesses or in argument to the jury after voir dire
examination proves counsel's lack of good faith and
requires a reversal.
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ERRONEOUS INSTRUCTIONS

Respondent states generally that "all" erroneous
instructions were cured when such instructions were
read as a whole. Such a sweeping statement evades the
issues and points of law presented for review in our
original brief. It is significant that counsel wholly fails
to discuss the most serious errors contained in the instructions.
Instruction No. 11
To simply state that this erroneous instruction was
cured by another instruction stating the general rule
that "one has a right to assume that others using the
highway will use reasonable care until put on notice
to the contrary," but sidesteps the most hurtful effect
of said instruction. The important point is that the instruction erroneously tells the jury that it was the duty
of Kenneth Butte TO AVOID COLLIDING WITH ANY
PERSON OR OTHER CAR.
The erroneous and misleading effect of such statement defining the duty of
defendant, can be appreciated by the fact that average jurors are not familiar with abstract rules of law.
Their minds are not like trial judges and attorneys.
To tell the jury that it is the duty of the defendant
TO AVOID COLLIDING WITH ANY PERSON OR OTHER
CAR ON THE HIGHWAY is but to tell the jury the de-

fendant was at fault if his car collided with the one
in which deceased was riding. In Knutson v. Lurie,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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(Iowa) 251 N. W. 14?', and Fry v. Smith, (Iowa) 253
N. W. 147, it was held that even a portion of the same
fustruction could not cure another part of such in·
'strU.ction wherein the duty of defendant was erroneously defined, the jury in such instance being likely
to feel bound by the absolute duty. We submit this instruction is erroneous, confusing, self-contradictory, and
calculated to mislead the jury.
Instruction No. 12
The authorities respondent has cited in an effort
to sustain instruction No. 12 have no application to
the instant case in that the city ordinance relied on in
the instant case is void on its face, and specific objection
(Dft. Ab. 125) was made to the giving of said instruction. It is not necessary to specifically plead the invalidity of an ordinance in such case. 4J C. ]., page 5?'9,
cited by respondent reads as follows:
"Since an ordinance u:hich is not void on its
face is presumed to he valid, one who relies on
its invalidity must plead this fact and allege facts
showing it to be invalid."
In Roper v. Greenspon, (Mo.) 198 S. W. 1107, the
ordinance was in fact valid, and it was, therefore, error
to refuse to admit it in evidence. On page 1110 of the
opinion, the actual holding of the court is stated:
"We hold the ordinance in question a valid
one and that for this reason, there was error in
refusing to admit it in evidence."
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In Neary v. Northern Pacific Railroad Company,
(Mont.) 110 Pac. 226, page 28 respondent's brief, the ordinance was not void on its face, and the same is true
of American Railway Express Company vs. Lancaster,
(Ky.) 251 S. W. 670, page 31, respondent's brief, which
case did not even have to do with the invalidity of the
ordinance, and note the quotation from American Fork
City v. Charlier, 43 Utah 231, 134 Pac. 739, page 29
respondent's brief, where an exception is noted "where it
appears on the face of the ordinance that the city exceeded the power."
In view of the fact that the ordinance in the instant case is clearly void on its face, and specific objection was made to the giving of said instruction in
the trial court, it was error to submit such instruction
to the jury.
Instruction No. 14
Counsel attempts to avoid the point that although
this instruction placed upon the jury the absolute duty
of finding for plaintiff, if the conditions expressly stated
in the instruction were found in plaintiff's favor, it en-

tirely omitted the issue of plaintiff's contributory negLigence. The fact that this issue and other considerations
were omitted from said instruction No. 14 hut included
in other instructions cannot cure the erroneous instruction, because a clear conflict is created. We direct attention to the cases cited on pag·e 68 of our original brief.
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Instruction No. t 7
Respondent evades the errors in this instruction.
Like No. 14, instruction t 7 purports to lay down a formula under which the jury's verdict must be for the plaintiff, but wholly fails to take into consideration the issue
of plaintiff"s contributory negligence and is otherwise
misleading.
Respondent discusses none of the remaining erroneous instructions.

An instruction calculated to probably do harm is
prejudicial and reversible error. In jensen v. Utah Ry.
Company, 270 Pac. 349, 72 Utah 366, at page 400, the
rule is stated thusly:
··Where the committed error is of such nature
or character as calculated to do harm, or on its
face as having the natural tendency to do so,
prejudice will be presumed, until by the record
it is affirmatively shown that the error was not
or could not have been of harmful effect."
INSTRUCTIONS DENIED

Respondent nowhere specifically points out where
any of the instructions requested by defendant and refused by the court were fully and satisfactorily covered
in other instructions given. The requested instructions
refused by the court each presented a material issue
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on defendant's theory of the evidence and the case,
and a refusal to instruct on any one of such theories
affects defendant's substantial rights and is reversible
error.
Other substantial errors were assigned but not discussed by respondent. Some have a special significance
in view of counsel's misconduct relating to insurance.
Matters, such as reading in his argument to the jury
from a deposition not in evidence (Assignment of Error
No. 6), eliciting from his own witness, Gerald Franz,
the fact that "his claim was taken care of," (Assignment
of Error 28) making improper references to a criminal
proceeding against the defendant, Kenneth Butte, (Assignment of Error 31) all prevented defendant from having a fair trial, and these and other assignments of
error fully discussed in our original brief and not mentioned by respondent all merit consideration on this
appeal.

CONCLUSION
As
stances
and in
clusion

we view respondent's brief, he has in some inmerely attempted to avoid or cloud the issues,
other instances ignored the unavoidable conthat prejudicial error was committed.

Appellant does not contend that a new trial cannot
be granted where there has been a "plain disregard by
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the jury of the instructions of the court," or .. the evidence in the case as to satisfy the court that the verdict was rendered under a misapprehension of such instructions or under the influence of passion or prejudice."
Our position as supported by the authorities is that it
must clearly appear that there has been such a disregard
by the jury; that a disregard is not evidenced where
the questions of liability and damages are such as to
justify reasonable men in reaching the conclusion which
the jury reached. We have clearly pointed out in our
original brief that the verdict on the first trial was justified by the facts and the law, and there was, therefore,
no proper discretion to be exercised by the court. We
also pointed out that the authorities hold that the disregard by the jury of the instructions and the evidence
must be such as to make clear that the verdict "was
rendered under a misapprehension of such instructions
or under the influence of passion or prejudice."
We know of no case where there has been such a
plain disregard of fair court procedure as is evidenced
by this record. Prior to the impaneling of the jury, respondent stated his intention to interrogate the jury concerning insurance. He carried out this expressed intention to the letter. He claims the question asked Norma
Chamberlain was a proper question on cross examination, but made no use of the statement referred to and
in no manner attempted to impeach the witness although
the very statement referred to by counsel was handed
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to him in open court. This was followed by his argument to the jury and his statement wholly outside of the
record that "an investigator was out at the scene of the
accident." We regret the inclusion of the word "adjuster" at page 53 of our brief. While the record was
identified by us, our statement should not have been in
quotation marks. It is common knowledge, as recognized
by the courts, that the words "investigator" and "adjuster" are used interchangeably and in either event, the
jury could not have been mistaken that counsel meant
"insurance investigator." Assignments of error relating
to the question of insurance, with the record supporting
them, preclude any conclusion other than that respondent intended that the jury should clearly understand
that an insurance company was involved. We do not believe this court will place its stamp of approval on the
trial of cases based on prejudicial misconduct such as
was permitted by the trial court.
A court should not improperly instruct a jury
contrary to statutory law, particularly when such instruction is based upon an ordinance invalid upon its
face. While it is contended that appellant is estopped
from asserting this invalidity, the fact remains that this
court declared such ordinance invalid after the issues
had been framed. The court should have instructed on
the basis of the law announced by this court, and this
is particularly true where appellant in open court excepted to the instruction. If the instruction was invalid
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on its face, the verdict of the jury was based upon an
improper statement of the law, and appellant should not

he prejudiced when the trial court had an opportunity
to correct its instruction, and particularly when, as
pointed out, the error appeared upon the face of the
ordinance, and extraneous evidence was not necessary
to establish the invalidity.
Assignments of error relating to other instructions
and not argued hy respondent cannot be avoided. A
general instruction, as pointed out by the authorities
cited in our original brief, will not cure an erroneous
mandate contained in another instruction.
Appellant respectfully submits that the trial court
invaded the province of the jury in granting a new trial.
Without any showing whatsoever, the trial court could
not say that there was "a plain disregard by the jury
of the instructions * * * or the evidence." The trial
court could not say without any showing that the verdict was the result of "influence or passion or prejudice." The court could not say, contrary to the finding of
eight jurors, that plaintiff, a father, was entitled to
substantial damages on account of the death of a mature
son, who lived months away from home, when plaintiff had other sons living with him and contributing
to his support, and when he himself had a substantial
income.
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We submit that this court should not hold that
the record of misconduct and error in this case was not
prejudicial.
We respectfully submit that appellant should he
granted the relief as prayed.
Respectfully submitted

RALPH T. STEWART
GERALD IRVINE
Attorneys for Appellant,
Kenneth Butte.
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